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Summary
The article analyzes the political changes that have taken place in Greece following a dou-
ble parliamentary election of 2015 (in January and September), focusing on three levels: 
1) party system change, 2) electoral system change into parliament, 3) constitutional re-
form. The first part of the text sets out the basic changes in the structure of the party sys-
tem, emphasizing the electoral victory of the radical forces – the far left populist SYRI-
ZA or the rise of the far-right (Golden Dawn) in the double election of 2015.
The paper also briefly reviews the nature and functioning of the Greek parliamenta-
ry electoral system with special regard to the newly adopted electoral law. In this respect, 
the paper highlights the main constitutional principles governing suffrage, as a necessary 
background to examining and understanding the framework upon which Greek elector-
al systems are based. It also presents the main features of the current electoral system, 
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since it is the one to be applied in the following parliamentary election. The focus will 
be then on the recent reform of the electoral system in Greece after the adoption of Law 
4406/2016. The paper analyses its most significant aspects and raises a number of rele-
vant questions. Special reference is made to the voting procedure followed by the Greek 
Parliament for the adoption of Law 4406/2016, since it is a key factor for its enforcement.
Since the outbreak of the crisis discussions about constitutional reform have been 
ongoing in Greece, although the initiation of a formal amendment process was blocked 
until 2013, due to the time-constraints imposed by the constitutional amending formu-
la. The paragraph assesses the proposals made in July 2016 by the Tsipras government 
for a radical revision of the 1975 Constitution, taking into account the intense debate 
which engaged Greek constitutional law scholars. The Author highlights the particular 
features of the Greek constitutional revision model, characterized by political-elite-driv-
en change which has led in the past to amending attempts lacking of a broad consensus. 
The broad scope of the proposed amendments requires political foresight and caution 
to prevent the constitutional revision from being reduced to a mere political diversion 
to ensure the permanence in power of certain political actors in the absence of consent 
and to deflect attention from continued controversial austerity policies.
Streszczenie
Zmiany w systemie politycznym w Grecji 
po wyborach powszechnych w 2015 r.
Artykuł analizuje zmiany polityczne, jakie zaszły w Grecji po podwójnych wyborach par-
lamentarnych z 2015 r. (w styczniu i wrześniu), koncentrując się na trzech płaszczyznach: 
1) zmiany modelu systemu partyjnego, 2) zmiany systemu wyborczego do parlamentu, 
3) reformy konstytucji. W pierwszej części tekstu określono podstawowe zmiany w struk-
turze systemu partyjnego, podkreślając zwycięstwo wyborcze radykalnych ugrupowań – 
lewicowej Syrizy czy skrajnej prawicy (Złoty Świt) w podwójnej elekcji z 2015 r.
W drugiej części artykułu została omówiona charakterystyka i sposób funkcjonowa-
nia greckiego parlamentarnego systemu wyborczego, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem 
nowo przyjętej ordynacji wyborczej. Zwrócono uwagę na główne zasady konstytucy-
jne dotyczące prawa wyborczego, jako niezbędnego tła dla zbadania i zrozumienia ram, 
na których opierają się greckie systemy wyborcze. Przedstawiono główne cechy obec-
nego systemu wyborczego na podstawie ostatniej reformy systemu wyborczego w Grec-
ji, ustawy no. 4406 z 2016 r. Artykuł analizuje jego najważniejsze aspekty i porusza sze-
reg istotnych pytań. Odwołuje się szczególnie do procedury głosowania prowadzonej 
przez grecki parlament w celu przyjęcia ustawy 4406/2016, ponieważ jest to kluczowy 
czynnik jej egzekwowania.
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Ostatnia część artykuły została poświęcona planowej zmianie greckiej konstytuc-
ji. Od wybuchu kryzysu gospodarczego w Grecji trwają dyskusje na temat reformy kon-
stytucyjnej, chociaż proces formalnej zmiany został wstrzymany do 2013 r., ze względu 
na ograniczenia czasowe narzucone w konstytucji. W artykule dokonano oceny propozy-
cji złożonych przez rząd Tsiprasa w lipcu 2016 r. w celu radykalnej rewizji konstytucji 
z 1975 r. Autorka podkreśla szczególne cechy greckiego modelu rewizji konstytucyjnej, 
charakteryzującego się zmianami kierowanymi przez elitę polityczną, które doprowadziły 
w przeszłości do zmian bez większego konsensusu. Szeroki zakres proponowanych po-
prawek wymaga politycznego przewidywania i ostrożności, aby zapobiec przekształce-
niu rewizji konstytucji w zwykłą zmianę polityczną oraz aby zapewnić ciągłość władzy 
niektórych podmiotów politycznych przy braku zgody i odwrócić uwagę od wciąż kon-
trowersyjnych polityk oszczędnościowych.
*
I.
Radicalizasion of public sentiment as the economic crisis deepened was 
bound to contribute to a change in the support for political parties after the 
2008. The conservative parties of New Democracy and the Panhellenic So-
cialist Movement (PASOK) formed in 1974 after the fall of the Black Colo-
nels dictatorship led to the creation of a dual-party system which had not 
left much room for other parties, such as the Communist Party of Greece 
or the right-wing Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) and smaller groups that 
formed the Synaspismos coalition, later to be called the Syriza4. The deep-
ening economic crisis of 2008 and the social and economic effects it caused 
led to the transformation of the Greek political scene at the expense of its 
destabilisation and fragmentation. The two leading parties were mainly 
blamed for the deteriorating living conditions, with most of the criticism 
falling on PASOK, which had won the elections in 2009 and had negoti-
ated the first international assistance programme. Despite numerous pro-
4 M. Lorencka, Influence of the economic crisis on the functioning of the political systems in 
Greece, [in:] T. Kubin, M. Lorencka, M. Mysliwiec, Impact of economic crisis on functioning of 
political systems. A case study of Greece, Spain, and Italy, Katowice 2017, pp. 105–114.
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tests and riots, on 6 May 2010, the socialists adopted anact accepting the fi-
nancial aid package.
The extent of social discontent and the necessity of further financial as-
sistance made the Prime Minister Jorgos Papandreou (grandson and son of 
Greek prime ministers) announce a referendum to decide on this matter, how-
ever, several days later, he withdrew from the idea and submitted his resig-
nation on 11 November 2011. The president Karolas Papoulias stated that the 
objective of the new government would be to hold new elections after negoti-
ation of the next international assistance package. The nonpartisan techno-
crat Lucas Papadimos, former vice-president of the European Central Bank, 
was elected as prime minister with the support of PASOK and New Democ-
racy. The next financial assistance package was accepted in February of 2012. 
A strong division developed, consisting of parties supporting the assistance 
programmes, such the PASOK or New Democracy and into anti-memoran-
dum groups (groups opposing the bailouts), such as the Syriza, the Radical 
Left Party or the Golden Dawn, an extreme right-wing party formed in 1993, 
which had never previously entered parliament, as it had failed to reach the 
required 3% threshold. In the meantime, many divisions appeared within 
individual parties as well. Dora Bakoyannis left the New Democracy party 
to form the liberal-conservative Democratic Alliance party. In 2012, Panos 
Kammenos left the same party to establish the Independent Greeks party 
and in 2010, a group of former Eurocommunism supporters left the Syriza 
to form the Democratic Left (DIMAR). Significant changes also took place 
inside the parties. Syriza, which was formed in 2004, a coalition of a dozen 
or so radical groups, replaced their leader. In 2010, Alekos Alavanos (born in 
1950, a former member of the Greek Communist Party) was replaced with the 
36-year-old Alexis Tsipras. The main slogans of the party include unity and 
radicalism and opposition to any form of coalition with the socialists or re-
formists. Another milestone in Syriza’s activity was its transformation from 
a loose coalition of political groups into a political party during the founding 
congress held on 10–14 July 2013. Alexis Tsipras was re-elected as party sec-
retary in the primaries. The party itself constituted a blend of different ideol-
ogies (from anticapitalism, Trotskyism, through various communist and so-
cialist ideologies to feminism).
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The New Democracy won the 2007 elections with over 41% of votes, where-
as in 2009, the socialist PASOK came out victorious with over 43% of sup-
port. Both the parties formed single-party cabinets. They won the majority 
in parliament thanks to a 40-seat bonus given, in principle, to the victorious 
party, a regulation that was introduced into the proportional electoral sys-
tem. In 2008, the majority bonus was increased to 50 seats. These elections 
were characterised by two-party competition.
The geopolitical situation was relevantly altered by the elections of 6 May 
and 17 June 2012. The double parliamentary elections were the result of the 
inability to appoint a government. They were also a sign of protest against 
austerity. The electoral volatility index reached its highest value in history – 
48.7 (May 2012), which means that every other voter changed his or her elec-
toral preferences. Seven political groups entered parliament. Although the 
New Democracy won both the elections, its support in May reached 18.85%, 
while in June it was 29.66% (caused by a fear that Syriza might win). The run-
ner-up was the radical left, achieving 16.79% of votes in May and 26.89% in 
June. PASOK suffered the greatest defeat. It received 13% of votes in May and 
12.28% in June. For the first time in history, the neo-fascist Golden Dawn par-
ty managed to enter into parliament with a result of almost 7% of votes. This 
far right party founded by Nikolaos Michaloliakos, uses symbols that appear 
to be similar to those used by the NSDAP (the party’s meander symbol with 
the same colours as the NSDAP flag).
In 2012, new parties managed to enter into parliament, including the left-
wing DIMAR or the nationalist Independent Greeks party. Their presence will 
be of significance in the context of creating political coalitions following the 
dual elections of 2012 and 2015. The only time the Greeks had to form a coa-
lition was in 1989, which means that a new standard of competition and co-
operation developed between political parties. After the 2012 elections, An-
tonis Samaras from the New Democracy became the prime minister, and 
formed a coalition with PASOK and DIMAR.
The next early parliamentary elections took place on 25 January 2015 be-
cause of the inability of the Chamber of Deputies to elect the President of the 
Republic, and on 20 September 2015 because of the division that had formed 
in the Syriza as a result of the acceptance in July of the 3rd assistance pro-
gramme. The above elections had one victor – the party of Alexis Tsipras, who 
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became the prime minister. In January, Syriza received the support of 36.34% 
of voters, while in September – 35.34%. It was, however impossible to win 
a majority of seats in the parliament, that is why a coalition was formed with 
the nationalist party of Independent Greeks. This rather exotic political coa-
lition was formed on the grounds of both the parties’ opposition to the con-
ditions of the memoranda.
ΙΙ.
The legal rules regulating the parliamentary electoral system in Greece are laid 
down either in the Constitution of Greece5 or in ordinary laws (and, by leg-
islative delegation, general regulatory administrative acts, namely presiden-
tial decrees and ministerial decrees).
The main general principles for the composition of the Hellenic Parliament 
and the electoral procedure for the election of its Members are formulated in 
Art. 51–57 of the Constitution. While these provisions contain rules on is-
sues regarding, inter alia, the principle of free and unfalsified expression of 
the popular will, as an expression of popular sovereignty (Art. 52), the prin-
ciples of direct, universal, secret6 (Art. 51 § 3) and compulsory7 (Art. 51 § 5) 
suffrage, the principle of simultaneous elections (Art. 51 § 4), the minimum 
(two hundred Members of Parliament, hereafter MPs) and maximum (three 
hundred MPs) number of MPs (Art. 51 § 1), the duration of the parliamenta-
5 The Constitution of Greece translated in English, French and German is available at: 
http://www.parliament.gr/en/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/To-Politevma/Syntagma (26.09.2016).
6 The jurisprudence of the Special Supreme Court (see Decisions no. 48/1978, 35/1982, 
11, 12, 13/1994, 58/1995, 34/1999 and others) and also the legal theory (see, among others, 
Pr. Dagtoglou, Constitutional Law, Human rights, 3rd ed., Athina–Komotini 2010, pp. 1209 
ff., Ph. Vegleris, The particular nature of electoral law, Athina–Komotini 1992, p. 51) have rec-
ognized that the principle of the equality of the vote derives implicitly from the Constitution 
of Greece (see Art. 4 § 1, 2 which guarantees the general principle of equality, and Art. 1 § 2, 
which sets out the democratic principle). Prof. K. Mavrias, Constitutional Law, 5th ed., Athens 
2014, pp. 380–382) takes the view that the principle of the equality of the vote, either explicitly 
or implicitly grounded in the Constitution, does not necessarily leads to the application of the 
equivalence of the vote.
7 The Constitutional Revision of 2001 implicitly prohibits the imposition of criminal 
sanctions for not voting.
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ry period (four consecutive years) and the substitution of the MPs (Art. 53), 
the qualifications (Art. 55), the disqualifications (Art. 56) and the incompat-
ibilities (Art. 57) for MPs, etc., they do not set the electoral system8.
Article 54 § 19 of the Constitution of Greece grants the ordinary legisla-
tor10 the competence to choose an electoral system “after taking into account 
the current political conditions”11, so that adaptability to the changing polit-
ical and social circumstances (and the consequent goal of governmental sta-
bility) is achieved12. The wide discretion of the legislator to choose an electoral 
system is limited by the general principles of state13 and the above mentioned 
constitutional principles governing suffrage14.
The general pattern of almost15 all systems used in Greek parliamentary 
elections after 1974 was the so-called ‘ameliorated’ or ‘reinforced’ propor-
8 K. Chryssogonos, Electoral system and Constitution, Athina–Komotini 1996, pp. 36 ff.
9 See Art. 54 § 1 of the Constitution of Greece: “The electoral system and constituencies 
are specified by statute [...]”.
10 Unlike the constitutions of other European countries (for example, Austria, Sweden 
and Portugal), see the Report of 18.07.2016 of the Scientific Service of the Hellenic Par-
liament on the Bill “Proportional representation of political parties, extension of the right 
to vote and other provisions concerning the election of Members of the Parliament” (Law 
no. 4406/2016, Official Gazette 133 Α/26.07.2016), rapporteur: D. Kanellopoulos, www.
hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/7b24652e-78eb-4807-9d68-e9a5d4576eff/analeklog-epist.
pdf (9.10.2016). According to Art. 65 § 5 and 74 § 1 of the Constitution of Greece and Art. 
162 § 3 subpar. a’ of the Hellenic Parliament’s Standing Orders, the Scientific Service of 
the Hellenic Parliament is responsible, inter alia, for the scientific elaboration of Bills for 
the Plenum. Its Report contains the results of the scientific elaboration of Bills, including, 
among others, in-depth study on the most significant arising legal issues, detailed comments 
on the compatibility of the proposed provisions with the constitutional rules, the EU and 
the international law, extended research on legal bibliography and case law of the domestic, 
EU and international courts, etc.
11 See Decision no. 12/1994 of the Special Supreme Court.
12 See K. Chryssogonos, An introduction to Greek electoral law, http://www.cecl.gr/rigas-
network/databank/REPORTS/r8/GR_8_Chryssogonos.html (9.10.2016).
13 See E. Venizelos, Lessons of Constitutional Law, Athina–Komotini 2008, pp. 485 ff., 
G. Papadimitriou, Electoral system and governance system, [in:] Electoral system and form of govern-
ment, Athina–Thessaloniki 2007, pp. 19–28, K. Chryssogonos, Electoral system..., pp. 159–298.
14 See Decisions no. 4, 11, 14/1994, 12/1994 of the Special Supreme Court.
15 The sole exception was the proportional system (simple proportionality) used in the 
three consecutive elections of 1989 and 1990, which reduced the first party premium to a min-
imum, causing thereby governmental instability for several months.
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tional system, which gives the first party a considerably higher share of par-
liamentary seats than its share of votes is16.
The current electoral system of Greece is set by Law 3231/2004 as it is 
amended by the Law 3636/2008. Principal characteristics of this electoral sys-
tem are the following:
The MPs are elected according to the results of votes of their political par-
ty in each district (the party candidates are selected by voters within the par-
ty list of their choice by marking a cross next to the name of the candidate(s) 
of their choice17), except twelve (12) State Deputies, who, according to Art. 
54 § 3 of the Constitution18, are elected in proportion to the total number of 
votes of their party throughout the country, according to a party-list propor-
tional representation system, the whole country then being regarded as one 
constituency.
A parliamentary majority can be achieved and a government formed even 
if the winning party fails to secure a simple majority of the valid votes. This 
outcome is made possible by awarding extra representation (essentially a bo-
nus) to the larger parties that obtain more than a minimum percentage of 
the national vote. This electoral system grants the winning political party (or 
coalition of parties19) a majority premium of fifty (50)20 seats21. Consequent-
16 This happens at the expense of smaller parties. See K. Chryssogonos, An introduction...
17 The number of crosses varies from one to five depending on constituency size. Ballots 
with no. crosses or more crosses than allowed, count for only the party but not the individual 
candidates.
18 See Art. 54 § 3 of the Constitution of Greece.
19 The majority bonus is awarded to a coalition of parties provided that the mean share 
of the vote of the coalition parties is greater than the vote share of the single party with the 
largest number of votes (see Law 3636/2008 Art. 1 amending Law 3231/2004 Art. 6 § 1 and 2).
20 Law 3231/2004 was less favorable for the plurality party, as only forty (40) additional 
seats were reserved for them. Law 3636/2008 increased the number of bonus seats from forty 
(40) to fifty (50).
21 For the relevant constitutional issues, see, among others, the Report of 21.01.2008 of 
the Scientific Service of the Hellenic Parliament on the Bill “Amendment of the Law 3231/2004 
«Election of Members of the Parliament»” (Law 3636/2008, Official Gazette 11 Α/01.02.2008), 
rapporteur: D. Kanellopoulos, http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/7b24652e-
78eb-4807-9d68-e9a5d4576eff/eklogi-epis.pdf (9.10.2016), Ch. Anthopoulos, The control of 
constitutionality of the electoral laws in Greece and the unconstitutionality of the current electoral 
system, “Efimerida Dioikitikou Dikaiou” 2015, pp. 559–574.
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ly, only the two hundred fifty (250) seats out of the three hundred (300) total 
are distributed to all the parties under the proportional system. It should be 
noted that the various reinforced systems applied since 1974 in Greece vary 
only in the relative advantage that each version has bestowed upon the top 
two or three parties22.
Parties, coalitions of parties and independent candidates are required 
to garner at least three percent (3%) of the total share of the vote nationally 
in order to be represented in parliament23.
The protest votes (white or blank-ballots) are not counted as valid. They 
are added to the number of void votes and are not considered during the seats 
distribution24.
ΙΙΙ.
On 21.07.2016 the Plenum of the Hellenic Parliament adopted the Law 
no. 4406/2016 “Proportional representation of political parties, extension of 
the right to vote and other provisions concerning the election of Members 
of the Parliament”25. Law 4406/2016 amended the previous Law 3231/200426 
22 See M. Mendrinou, The electoral policy in the Greek political system: internal and 
external aspects, 1974–2000, Athina 2000, pp. 75–87, C. Lamprinakou, Electoral System 
Change in Europe since 1945: Greece, https://www.google.gr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&es-
rc=s&source=web&cd=9&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUK Ew jSjZf5u83PA hV Mth-
QK HR iI A B4QFghd M Ag&url=http%3A%2F%2Fw w w.electoralsystemchanges.
eu%2FFiles%2Fmedia%2FMEDIA_199%2FFILE%2FGreece_summary.docx&usg=AFQ-
jCNGa4TWp9XuO8KRJYLMsVZGCwotf VA&bvm=bv.135258522,d.bGg (9.10.2016).
23 Law 3231/2004, Art. 5. The 3% threshold was considered by the Special Supreme 
Court as compatible with the rules of the Constitution of Greece, see Decisions no. 19/2010, 
34/1999, 74/1997, 11/1994, and others. As a consequent, the larger the number of votes for 
parties that do not reach this 3% threshold, the lowest the number of votes required for the 
first party to secure an absolute majority (of 151 seats) in parliament.
See Law 3434/2006 (Official Gazette 21 Α/07.02.2006) Art. 1. See also Special Supreme 
Court Decision no. 34/1999 (contra: Decision no. 12/2005).
24 See Law 3434/2006 (Official Gazette 21 Α/07.02.2006) Art. 1. See also Special Su-
preme Court Decision no. 34/1999 (contra: Decision no. 12/2005).
25 Official Gazette 133 Α/26.07.2016.
26 Official Gazette 45 Α/11.02.2004.
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(as it was amended by the Law 3636/2008). This is the sixteenth parliamen-
tary electoral system since 192627 and the eighth since 197428. Law 4406/2016 
Art. 2 § 2 repealed Art. 6 § 2 and 3 of Law 3231/2004 (as they were amended 
by the Law 3636/2008 Art. 1). Therefore, the 50 seats majority bonus to the 
party that obtain the plurality of valid votes was repealed. At the same time, 
Law 4406/2016 Art. 2 § 1 point a. amended Art. 6 § 1 of Law 3231/2004 (as it 
was amended by the Law 3636/2008 Art. 1) by increasing the multiplication 
factor from two hundred and fifty (250) in three hundred (300). This means 
that the total number of valid votes polled by each combination nationally is 
multiplied by 300 (instead of 250).
By this reform, the reinforced proportional system is retained but it will 
function under a new variation: the representation of the political parties be-
comes more proportional. In this respect, the new electoral system takes us 
back to the electoral Law 1907/199029. In other words, the reinforced propor-
tional system becomes as it was set before Law 3231/2004, where the bonus 
award was first introduced.
One of the main subjects that dominated the debate of the bill (which be-
came then the Law 4406/2016) in the Plenum of Parliament was the strong con-
cerns regarding the issue whether the repeal of the bonus would lead to weak 
formations of governments and continuing elections and, even worse, to po-
litical instability and a vulnerable state30. Among the many interesting aspects 
of that issue, one can distinguish the constitutional approach.
27 In 1926 the country abandoned majority voting, conducted through dropping lead balls 
in a ballot box, see R. Clogg, Greece, [in:] Democracy and Elections: Electoral Systems and Their 
Political Consequences, eds. V. Bogdanor, D. Butler, Cambridge 1983, p. 190. See also A. Pan-
telis, The Greek electoral systems and the elections (1926–1985) on the computer, Athens 1988.
28 Following the collapse of the military government, known as Colonels’ regime 
(1967–1974), an appointed interim government of prominent politicians (known as “National 
Unity Government”) undertook the task of the democratisation of the Greek state and the 
declaration of the Third Hellenic Republic.
29 Official Gazette 163 Α/39.11.1990.
30 See the Minutes of Hellenic Parliament’s sittings of 19.07.2016, 20.07.2016 and 
21.07.2016, available in Greek at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Praktika/Synedria-
seis-Olomeleias?sessionRecord=b4588e74-e242-4b1a-9e39-a649001b12b3 (9.10.2016) http://
www.hellenicparliament.gr/Praktika/Synedriaseis-Olomeleias?sessionRecord=4bc3244b-0
a8d-4b18-be91-a64a00a02629 (9.10.2016) and http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Praktika/
Synedriaseis-Olomeleias?sessionRecord=9ee047ee-34c1-4b42-9cf8-a64b0025fce0 (9.10.2016).
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As it has already been mentioned above, the Constitution of Greece does 
not set the electoral system31. Therefore, the electoral system may pursue both 
the aim of accurate representation of political forces in Parliament, and the 
aim of safeguarding governmental stability. Both aims are within the con-
stitutional spectrum32. The appropriate and adequate mix lies with the ordi-
nary legislator. On the basis of the above, it may be concluded that only ex-
treme legislative options would be considered violating the Constitution33.
It is, however, common throughout Greek electoral systems that the aim 
of governmental stability is consolidated over the equivalence of the vote34. 
In the past, the constitutionality of some variations of the reinforced propor-
tional electoral system of Greece has been challenged. The Electοral Court 
and the Special Supreme Court never detected a violation of the constitution-
al principles governing the vote and the suffrage35.
Law 4406/2016 Art. 1 amended Art. 4 § 1 of Presidential Decree 26/201236 
by setting the minimum voting age to seventeen (17), instead of eighteen (18)37.
It is worth nothing that by virtue of Art. 51 § 3 of the Constitution of Greece 
the minimum age of the electorate is determined by law: “The Members of 
31 See Art. 54 § 1 of the Constitution of Greece.
32 See Art. 1 § 2–3, 4 § 1–2 and 41 § 1 of the Constitution of Greece.
33 See E. Venizelos, op.cit, pp. 485 ff.
34 See K. Mavrias, op.cit, p. 433, E. Venizelos, op.cit., pp. 486 ff., N. Kalogirou, Parlia-
mentary republic and electoral system, Athina–Komotini 1989, pp. 16–21. For the governmental 
stability as a constitutional principle, see K. Chryssogonos, Electoral system..., pp. 440 ff.
35 See Decisions no. 20, 30, 31/1951, 13/1958 of the Electοral Court and Decisions 
no. 48/1978, 36, 39/1990, 11, 12, 13/1994, 23, 24, 25, 51,74/1997 of the Special Supreme 
Court. See also the Report of 18.07.2016 of the Scientific Service of the Hellenic Parliament on 
the Bill “Proportional representation [...]” (Law no. 4406/2016), p. 7 and the citations it refers 
to: A. Raikos, The control of the validity of the elections of 20th November 1977, 1st complement of 
procedural electoral law, 1983, pp. 60 ff., A. Raikos, The control of the validity of the parliamen-
tary and European parliamentary elections, 4th Complement of procedural electoral law, 1993, 
pp. 125 ff., A. Raikos, The control of the validity of the parliamentary and European parliamentary 
elections, 5th Complement of procedural electoral law, 1996, pp. 153 ff., A. Raikos, The control 
of the validity of the elections of 22nd Septempter 1996, 6th Complement of procedural electoral 
law, 1999, pp. 250 ff. See also K. Chryssogonos, Electoral system..., pp. 332–342.
36 Official Gazette 57 Α/15.03.2012.
37 It is interesting to note that, according to Art. 4 § 2 of Presidential Decree 26/2012, 
“for the purpose of the previous paragraph, the 1st January is considered to be the date of birth 
of all who were born in that year”.
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Parliament shall be elected [...] by the citizens who have the right to vote, as 
specified by law The law cannot abridge the right to vote except in cases where 
a minimum age has not been attained [...]”38. Prior to the publication of Law 
4406/2016, the right to vote was granted (by Law 1224/198139) to individuals 
who were at least eighteen years old (or would turn eighteen on the year of 
the election)40. That meant that the minimum voting age was (more or less) 
equal to that of reaching adulthood.
Although on the one hand, the Constitution of Greece does not create ob-
stacles for the reduction of the voting age, and on the other hand, Greece is not 
the first country to grant the right to vote to parliamentary elections to indi-
viduals who are less than eighteen years old41, the reduction of the minimum 
voting age to seventeen by Law 4406/2016 raises some questions. For example, 
according to Art. 127 of the Civil Code of the Hellenic Republic, only eighteen 
years old man/woman possesses unlimited legal capacity. According to Art. 
64 § 1 of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure she who does not possess unlim-
ited legal capacity cannot stand before civil courts in her own name (she is 
represented by her legal representatives). In that context the right to vote in 
an age under the age of majority seems rather inconsistent.
It is interesting to highlight that some parts of the voting procedure of Law 
4406/2016 are of considerable importance for the starting point of the appli-
cability of its provisions.
According to Art. 54 § 1 of the Constitution of Greece “The electoral sys-
tem and constituencies are specified by statute which shall be applicable as 
of the elections after the immediately following ones, unless an explicit pro-
38 Art. 51 § 3 of the Constitution of Greece.
39 Official Gazette 340 Α/31.12.1981.
40 Provided they are on the electoral register, unless i. they are imprisoned for a criminal 
offence and they have been expressly deprived of the right to vote by judicial decision, or ii. 
they are mentally incapable of making a reasoned judgment, according to a judicial decision.
41 For example, according to Art. 26 § 1 of the Constitution of Austria, “The National 
Council is elected by the Federal people [...] by men and women who have completed their 
sixteenth year of life on the day of election”. On the other hand, the reduction of the minimum 
voting age under eighteen (to sixteen) has been recommended by the Resolution 1826/23.06.2011 
of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, see the Report of 18.07.2016 of the 
Scientific Service of the Hellenic Parliament on the Bill “Proportional representation [...]” 
(Law no. 4406/2016), p. 5.
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vision, adopted by a majority of two thirds of the total number of Members 
of Parliament, provides for its immediate application as of the immediate-
ly following elections”42. This means that, as a general rule, simple majority 
voting of an electoral law (or a law amending electoral law) leads to a post-
ponement of its entry into force: it comes into effect in the second following 
election. As an exception to that rule, an electoral law could be immediately 
applicable (namely, in the subsequent election) only if a qualified parliamen-
tary majority of at least two hundred votes is achieved.
A central legal question raised here concerns the scope of the meaning 
of the term “electoral system” used in Art. 54 § 1 of the Constitution: Does 
it contain unanimously each law provision concerning the elections, or are 
there any issues that could be regulated by provisions applicable as of the fol-
lowing elections.
According to legal theory43, the electoral system is the set of the methods 
that are used in the elections, for the translation of vote totals into represen-
tative seats in Parliament. It therefore follows that other aspects of the elec-
toral procedure (such as the composition of the electorate and technical is-
sues of the electoral procedure) are not included within the meaning of the 
electoral system.
Accordingly, provisions of Law 4406/2016 ruling the methods by which 
votes are counted to determine the outcome of elections, such as Art. 2 § 1 
and 2 (which repealed the 50-seats bonus), could be applied immediately only 
if a qualified parliamentary majority of at least two thirds of the total num-
ber of MPs is achieved. On the other hand, provisions of the Law 4406/2016 
ruling the minimum voting age are in any case applied immediately as soon 
as the absolute majority of the present MPs (simple majority)44 is achieved.
42 This is a provision introduced by the Constitutional Revision of 2001. The former Art. 
54 § 1 stated that “The electoral system and constituencies are specified by statute”. This pro-
vision had permitted a series of electoral reforms by the governing parties which changed the 
electoral system a few months prior to the general election in order to get re-elected in office.
43 See E. Venizelos, op.cit, p. 477 ff.
44 See Art. 67 first sentence of the Constitution: “Parliament cannot resolve without an 
absolute majority of the members present, which in no. case may be less than one-fourth of 
the total number of the Members of Parliament” and Art. 24 § 2 first sentence of the Standing 
Orders: “If the Constitution or the Standing Orders do not specify differently, the Plenum 
of the Parliament cannot decide without the absolute majority of Members of Parliament 
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The aforementioned considerations reflect the procedure followed by the 
Hellenic Parliament while passing Law 4406/2016. Law provisions on voting 
age (Art. 1), which, as aforementioned, do not fall under Art. 54 § 1 of the 
Constitution, adopted by 180 MPs. As far as it concerns any legal consequenc-
es, it makes no. difference if these provisions passed by simple or by qualified 
majority. In any case they would enter into force immediately.
On the contrary, Art. 5 of Law 4406/2016 provides for the immediate appli-
cation of all of its other provisions (except for those referred to the voting age) 
under the conditions of Art. 54 § 1 of the Constitution, because it constitutes 
the “explicit provision” referred to Art. 54 § 1 of the Constitution. If Art. 5 was 
adopted by at least 200 MPs, then the provisions of Law 4406/2016 concern-
ing the electoral system and constituencies would enjoy immediate application. 
If not, they would be effective at the next-but-one elections. Article 5 of Law 
4406/2016 was voted by 179 MPs. The next election in Greece, therefore, will 
be held under the current electoral law, namely Law 3231/2004 (as it is amend-
ed by the Law 3636/2008), and not under the election system of Law 4406/2016. 
The elections after the next one will be held under the election system of Law 
4406/2016 (unless meanwhile a new electoral law is voted by at least 200 MPs).
As explained above, the Greek electoral system is rather complicated com-
pared to other European countries’ electoral systems. It is characterized as 
a «reinforced» proportional system under successive variations, more or less 
favorable for the majoritarian party (or the top two or three parties) and un-
favorable for the small parties. It is furthermore not static; it is continually 
evolving in response to political and social circumstances and seeks the bal-
ance between voting equality and governmental stability.
ΙV.
It is a season of constitutional change the one that some European Member 
States are lately undergoing. The economic crisis exerted a certain influence 
present. Such majority cannot be less than one fourth (1/4) of the total number of Members 
of Parliament” and 71 § 1 of the Standing Orders: “A voting on any subject is held either 
by raising a hand or by standing unless the Constitution or the Standing Orders explicitly 
specify a different manner”.
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in the debate over the constitutional revision in Greece. Since the outbreak 
of the crisis discussions about constitutional reform have been ongoing, 
although the initiation of a formal amendment process was blocked until 
2013, due to the time-constraints imposed by the constitutional amending 
formula45. The severe institutional malfunctions detected in Greece, such as 
the increase of fast-track legislation, the abdication of the legislature to the 
advantage of the Executive, the rise of the far-right and of the far-left pop-
ulist parties may not be solely considered as distinctive features qualifying 
the Greek case. Also in other countries of the Eurozone (Italy, Spain, Por-
tugal) institutions experienced similar consequences without necessarily 
initiating a constitutional revision process.
It is indeed certain that the crisis triggered the debate over constitutional 
revision, as many political actors discovered themselves convinced that the 
Constitution was to blame for the crisis and its devastating social costs. This 
is clearly one way to put it and it is somehow misleading. The other is that the 
Greek constitution proved highly adaptable to changes, while it was the po-
litical system that collapsed, because of endemic corruption, populism and 
nepotism46. In the end, probably both perspectives can be equally accepted. 
The crisis unearthed the great demand for a change coming from the Greek 
society characterized more and more from a profound loss of confidence in 
parliamentary institutions. How this wave of dissatisfaction has been inter-
preted by the political actors as a mandate to initiate a radical revision of the 
fundamental charter of the country, where other more urgent legislative ac-
tions could have been taken without a formal amendment process is a ques-
tion probably to be left unanswered47.
45 The requirement that a new revision process cannot be initiated within five years from 
the previous represents a characteristic feature of the Greek amending formula and a serious 
obstacle to constitutional innovation.
46 On the impact of the economic crisis on the Greek constitutional system, see G. Ar-
avantinou Lleonidi, L’impatto della crisi economica sul sistema costituzionale della Repubblica 
di Grecia, [in:] El Impacto De La Crisis Económica en Las Instituciones de La Ue y Los Estados 
Miembros, eds. F. Balaguer Callejón, M. Azpitarte, E. Guillén López et J.F. Sánchez Barrilao, 
Thomson Reuters Aranzadi, 2015, pp. 335–377.
47 Several scholars have recently called for changes that are indeed of a constitutional 
character but concern the substantial and not the formal Constitution.
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The recent parliamentary adoption of the new electoral law48 has con-
vinced the Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, that the time for the constitution-
alisation of the proportional system is ripe and that the decision can no. lon-
ger be delayed49.
In the comparative perspective, the Greek government’s decision pres-
ents some marked similarities with the Italian case, were the hot parliamen-
tary and academic debate over the constitutional revision, now at crossroads 
as a referendum will be held on Sunday 4 December 2016, has been linked 
to the controversial electoral law, the so-called Italicum, since the draft pro-
posal made its way in the Chamber50.
The core issues around which the political and academic debate developed 
in Greece are essentially: the institution of a Constitutional Court51, the pro-
vision of direct election for the President of the Republic, the strengthening 
48 The title of the law is the following «Αναλογική Εκπροσώπηση των πολιτικών κοµµάτων, 
διεύρυνση του δικαιώµατος εκλέγειν και άλλες διατάξεις περί εκλογής βουλευτών». The law 
has been published on the Official Journal 26 July 2016 (Φεκ 133 Α’/26.07.2016).
49 D. Antoniou, Απλή αναλογική στη συνταγματική αναθεώρηση, http://www.kathime-
rini.gr/868328/article/epikairothta/politikh/aplh-analogikh-sth-syntagmatikh-ana8ewrhsh 
(9.10.2016).
50 A. Papachelas, Η αναθεώρηση του Συντάγματος, http://www.kathimerini.gr/863439/
opinion/epikairothta/politikh/h-ana8ewrhsh-toy-syntagmatos (9.10.2016).
51 Against the institution of a Constitutional Court K. Mavrias, Εισήγηση κατά την 
ημερίδα της 27ης Φεβρουαρίου 2013. (SOURCE) The Autor would rather prefer the legislator 
to enhance the competences of the already existing Supreme Special Court. On the organiza-
tion of justice in Greece: K. Mavrias, Συνταγματικό δίκαιο, Sakkoulas 2005, Ν. Bakopoulou, 
Περι Των Αναθεωρητεων Διαταξεων Του Συνταγματος Αναφορικώςπρος το Συμβούλιον της 
Επικρατείας και την Οργάνωσιν της Διοικητικής Δικαιοσύνης, Library of aueb, F. Vegleris, 
La Constitution, la loi et les tribunaux en Grèce, “Annales de la Faculté de Droit de Liège” 1967, 
pp. 437–477, F. Vegleris, Χαρακτηριστικά του ελληνικού Συμβουλίου της Επικρατείας, celebratory 
tome of the Council of State, Ι, Sakkoulas 1979, pp. 13–43 (17), G. Ierapetritis, Το Σύνταγμα 
και ο δικαστής: Μια αέναη διαλεκτική σχέση. Σκέψεις με αφορμή τις αποφάσεις 3242/2004 και 
343/2004 του ΣτΕ για τον «βασικό μέτοχο, “Nomiko Vima” 2005, no. 4, p. 443, G. Ierapetritis, 
Ισορροπία εξουσιών και δικαστικός παρεμβατισμός: Συγκριτικές σκέψεις στη λειτουργία του 
Ελληνικού Συμβουλίου Επικρατείας και του Ανωτάτου Ομοσπονδιακού Δικαστηρίου των ΗΠ, 
[in:] Τιμητικός Τόμος για τα 75 χρόνια του Συμβουλίου Επικρατείας, Athens–Thessaloniki 
2004, G. Kassimatis, Μελέτες. IV, Ειδικά θέματα δικαστικής εξουσίας 1973–1999, Athens–Kom-
motinì 2000 τόμος IV/7, https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_ordinary_courts-18-EL-it.do 
(9.10.2016), V.A. Manitakis, Fondement et légalité du contrôle juridictionnel des lois en Grèce, 
“Revue internationale de droit comparé” 1988, no. 1, p. 39.
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of the role of the Parliament, the strengthening of direct democracy through 
the introduction of the referendum as a key political instrument and finally 
the constitutionalisation of the electoral system. The latter proposal is a strong 
element of rupture with respect to the intentions of the Greek constituents 
who considered more appropriate to vest the power to establish the electoral 
system in ordinary laws rather than in the Constitution.
Before considering the merits of the proposals made by the Tsipras gov-
ernment, it is worth briefly to consider the constitutional provisions relating 
to the amending process. Any assessment of the present proposal must take 
into account that the Greek constitutional revision model is characterized 
by complex amending formulas, political-elite-driven change and difficulty 
in reaching compromises in constitutional issues.
The amending formula of Art. 110 sets out a series of material limits that 
entrench the form of government and specific fundamental rights. The first 
limit to constitutional revision regards the republican form of government52, 
52 Similarly, the Italian constitution provides and regulates the amendment power in 
Section II of Title VI, allowing its exercise in respect of any provision or part of the Consti-
tution, except for the republican form of government ideally and substantially linked to the 
democratic principle (Art. 138–139). Constitutional law scholars have questioned the possibility 
of identifying a procedure to change the republican form of government, even in the presence 
of the limit set by Art. 139. Costantino Mortati gave a negative answer to this question, having 
the amending procedure the fundamental function of keeping the Constitution alive in time, 
adapting it to the emerging needs, it could never subvert the system of principles and values 
gathered in the original layout. On the constitutional revision in Italy see V. Angiolini, Costituente 
e costituito nell’Italia repubblicana, Padova 1995; A. Baldassarre, Il “referendum” costituzionale, 
“Quaderni costituzionali” 1995; P. Barile, La revisione della Costituzione, [in:] Commentario 
sistematico alla Costituzione italiana, eds. P. Calamandrei, A. Levi, II, Firenze 1950; S. Bartole, 
Interpretazioni e trasformazioni della Costituzione repubblicana, Bologna 2004; M. Bignami, Cos-
tituzione flessibile, costituzione rigida e controllo di costituzionalità in Italia (1848–1956), Milano 
1997; A. Cerri, voce Revisione costituzionale, “Enciclopedia giuridica”, vol. XXXI, Roma 1991; 
A. Cervati, S. Panunzio, P. Ridola, Studi sulla riforma costituzionale, Torino 2001; A. Cervati, 
La revisione costituzionale, [in:] AA.VV., Garanzie costituzionali e diritti fondamentali, Roma 
1997; S. Cicconetti, La revisione della Costituzione, Padova 1972; G. Contini, La revisione 
costituzionale in Italia, Milano 1971; G. de Vergottini, Referendum e revisione costituzionale: 
un’analisi comparativa, “Giurisprudenza costituzionale” 1994; M. Dogliani, Potere costituente e 
revisione costituzionale, [in:] G. Zagrebelsky, P.P. Portinaro, J. Luther, Il futuro della costituzione, 
Torino 1996; C. Esposito, La validità delle leggi, Milano 1934; C. Esposito, Costituzione. Leggi 
di revisione della costituzione e “altre” leggi costituzionali, [in:] Raccolta di scritti in onore di Carlo 
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followed by the limits related to Art. 2 § 1, Art. 4 § 1, 4 e, 7, Art. 5 § 1 and 3, 
Art. 13 § 1 and Art. 26 § 253.
The parliamentary form of government is, therefore, an unchange-
able organizing principle of the constitutional system, as well as the 
multi-party system and the rule of law. The amending power is vested 
Arturo Jemolo, Milano 1963, III; P. Faraguna, Ai confini della Costituzione. Principi supremi e 
identità della Costituzione, Milano 2015; G. Ferri, Il referendum nella revisione costituzionale, 
Padova 2001; M. Fioravanti, Costituzione e popolo sovrano, Bologna 1998; P.G. Grasso, Potere 
costituente, “Enciclopedia del diritto”, no. XXXIV, Milano 1985; T. Groppi, Federalismo e 
Costituzione. La revisione costituzionale negli Stati federali, Milano 2001; F. Lanchester, Cos-
tantino Mortati e la “Legislatura costituente”, [in:] Atti del Convegno Costantino Mortati: Potere 
costituente e limiti alla revisione costituzionale Roma 14 dicembre 2015, “Nomos – Le attualità 
nel diritto” 2016, no. 1; C. Lavagna, Le costituzioni rigide, Roma 1964; M. Manetti, La deroga 
all’Art. 138 Cost. e la mossa del cavallo, “Rassegna. Parlamentare” 2013; M.L. Mazzoni Hon-
orati, Il referendum nella procedura di revisione costituzionale, Milano 1982; F. Modugno, voce 
Revisione costituzionale, [in:] Dizionario di diritto pubblico, vol. V, ed. S. Cassese, Milano 2006; 
G. Morbidelli, Le dinamiche della costituzione, [in:] G. Morbidelli, L. Pegoraro, M. Volpi, Diritto 
costituzionale italiano e comparato, Bologna 1997; C. Mortati, Concetto, limiti, procedimento 
della revisione costituzionale (1952), ora in Raccolta di scritti, Milano 1972, II; A. Pace, Potere 
costituente, rigidità costituzionale, autovincoli legislativi, II ed., Padova 2002; A. Pace, Processi 
costituenti italiani 1996–1997, [in:] Studi in onore di Leopoldo Elia, II, Milano 1999; A. Pace, 
I limiti alla revisione costituzionale nell’ordinamento italiano ed europeo, [in:] Atti del Convegno 
Costantino Mortati: Potere costituente e limiti alla revisione costituzionale Roma, 14 dicembre 
2015, Nomos – Le attualità nel diritto n. 1/2016; S. Panunzio, Riforma delle istituzioni e parte-
cipazione popolare, “Quaderni costituzionali” 1992; C. Pinelli, Costituzione rigida e costituzione 
flessibile nel pensiero dei costituenti italiani, “Iustitia” 1980 e 1981; A. Pizzorusso, Art. 138, [in:] 
Commentario della Costituzione, Bologna–Roma 1981; M. Ruini, Il referendum popolare e la 
revisione della costituzione, Milano 1953.
53 On the constitutional revision: X. Contiades, Η συνταγματική αναθεώρηση, “Έθνος” 
14.06.2016; P. Lazaratos, Συνταγματική αναθεώρηση και Δημοψήφισμα, “Capital.gr”, 08.06.2016; 
G. Katrougalos, Γιατί νέο Σύνταγμα; Και πώς, “Καθημερινή”, 19.06.2016; I. Drossos, Το έδαφος 
και ο λόγος για τις συνταγματικές αλλαγές, “Αυγή”, 26.06.2016; P. Foundedaki, Αναθεώρηση 
με λιτή διατύπωση, Καθηγήτρια Συνταγματικού Δικαίου στο Τμήμα Πολιτικής Επιστήμης και 
Ιστορίας, “Καθημερινή”, 27.06.2016; X. Contiades, Εξορθολογισμός της διαδικασίας, http://
www.kathimerini.gr/870289/article/epikairothta/politikh/e3or8ologismos-ths-diadikasias 
(7.08.2016), About the limits to constitutional revision see G.X. Sotirelis, Ελαστικά και απα-
ρέγκλιτα όρια του άρθρου 110Σ, http://www.kathimerini.gr/870291/article/epikairothta/
politikh/elastika-kai-aparegklita-oria -toy-ar8roy-110s (7.08.2016), G. Metaxas, Ιερότητες 
και αναγκαιότητες, http://www.kathimerini.gr/870290/article/epikairothta/politikh/iero-
thtes-kai-anagkaiothtes (7.08.2016).
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exclusively in the monocameral Parliament and no. other constitution-
al body can interfere.
V.
As it has been said the amending procedure in quite complex and it is struc-
tured in two stages.
The need for a revision of the Constitution shall be established by a de-
cision taken by the Parliament, upon the proposal of at least fifty deputies 
and by a majority of three-fifths of the total number of Assembly members, 
in two votes by roll-call held at least one month apart. The provisions that 
are to be revised are specifically defined by this resolution. It will then be 
up to the next Parliament, the so-called Revisional Parliament to proceed 
to the amendment of the constitutional provisions within its first term. It 
is worth noting that Art. 110 provides for a system of reversed majorities 
for the adoption of the revision proposal by the first and the second Parlia-
ment. The Constitution of 1975 introduced this system to guarantee a cer-
tain equality among the first Parliament and the Revision Parliament. In 
case a proposal receives the absolute majority of the members of the “Boulì 
ton Ellìnon” (Βουλη των Ελληνων) in the first Parliament, but not the su-
permajority of the three-fifths, the Revisional Parliament proceeds to the 
amendment of the constitutional provisions with a majority of three-fifths 
of its members and vice versa. Each revision of the Constitution that has 
been passed is published in the Official Journal no. later than ten days fol-
lowing the vote of the Assembly and comes into force with a special reso-
lution of the Chamber.
The amending formula sets a mandatory time lapse between revisions, 
that is, revision of the Constitution is not permitted within five years of the 
completion of the previous one. The time-constraints set by the Constitution 
have been recently challenged by Greek constitutional law scholars paving the 
way to a new interpretative approach according to which the five-year con-
straint should be referred to the time before a constitutional amendment pro-
cedure is concluded and not to the pause between one revision and the oth-
er. This latest approach has gained some support especially in the aftermath 
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of recent unsuccessful reforming attempts54. The rules laid down in 1975 for 
constitutional revision aimed to preserve the rigid character of the Consti-
tution and to ensure the protection of the legal order. Often during the his-
tory of the Republic of Greece the complexity of the review process has trig-
gered the worried attention of politicians and academics. This is where the 
recent proposals for a radical revision of the amending formula come from, 
raising the concern of some Greek constitutional law scholars. If on one hand 
scholars have not detected any constitutional obstacle to the revision of the 
amending formula, provided it is respected and maintained the rigid charac-
ter of the 1975 Constitution, on the other hand, they haven’t refrained from 
expressing a certain skepticism about the second part of the Government’s 
proposal which aims to redefine the provisions not subject to revision under 
the first paragraph of Art.110. It is worth remembering that the complex revi-
sion process is a hallmark of the Greek Constitution with respect to the con-
stitutions of other European countries. It reflects the particular characteris-
tics of the political culture and the constitutional history of Greece, for this 
reason, any intervention that provides for radical changes should be subject 
to careful consideration.
Since 2013 several proposals for the revision of the Greek Constitution, 
most of which substantially converging, were submitted both by the majori-
ty and the opposition. This year, few days after the parliamentary vote on the 
new electoral law, on July 25, the Greek Prime Minister announced his pro-
posals for a revision of the Constitution of Greece55.
Making continuous reference to what he defined as “the new transition”, 
Alexis Tsipras, presented the SYRIZA-ANEL constitutional amendment pro-
posal structured in five “axes”: regime architecture, reinforcement of direct de-
mocracy, reinforcement of the rule of law, State–Church relations, social rights.
As for the changes affecting the form of government, the proposal entails the 
constitutionalisation of the proportional representation; the establishment of 
the constructive vote of no-confidence on the model of Art. 67 of the German 
54 The Greek constitution has been revised three times in the last four decades, with the 
last changes coming in 2008.
55 D. Antoniou, H πρόταση Τσίπρα για τη συνταγματική αναθεώρηση , http://www.
kathimerini.gr/868777/article/epikairothta/politikh/h-protash-tsipra-gia-th-syntagmatikh 
-ana8ewrhsh (25.07.2016).
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Basic Law (Mißtrauen im Bundestag)56; the direct election of the President of 
the Republic, the President would be elected by the Parliament if a qualified 
majority of two-thirds in two consecutive votes were reached. If these votes 
prove fruitless, then the people would directly elect one of the first two can-
didates that emerged from the parliamentary vote; the enhancement of the 
competences of the President of the Republic; fixed tenure for members of 
parliament suggesting that no. member of parliament can be elected for more 
than two consecutive parliamentary periods or eight consecutive years; the 
express provision that to be appointed as Prime Minister – with the excep-
tion of caretaking ones – one would have to be a member of the parliament.
The strengthening of direct democracy is, in fact, the second point en-
trenched in the proposal of the Greek government, which intends to make 
mandatory consultative referendums for the transfer of state functions. A ma-
jor innovation is the introduction of referendums by popular initiative. A ref-
erendum on a “national issue” could be initiated by 500 000 citizens; while one 
million signatures would be sufficient to call for a referendum to reject a bill 
approved by the Chamber – with the exception of budgetary bills57.
The third axis of the proposal aims to strengthen the rule of law through 
the establishment of a Supreme Court composed solely of judges entitled 
to rule on the constitutionality of a law following a proposal of the President 
of the Republic or 120 deputies. It also provides for the abolition of parlia-
mentary immunities and a radical overhaul of the provisions relating to the 
responsibility of ministers.
Regarding the relations between the Greek State and the Orthodox Church 
(Art. 3 Cost.), the government’s proposal provides for the formalization of state 
56 Art. 67 GG: “[1] The Bundestag may express its lack of confidence in the Federal 
Chancellor only by electing a successor by the vote of a majority of its Members and requesting 
the Federal President to dismiss the Federal Chancellor. The Federal President must comply 
with the request and appoint the person elected. [2] Forty-eight hours shall elapse between the 
motion and the election“. In this regard see. F. Lanchester, Le costituzioni tedesche da Francoforte 
a Bonn. Introduzione e testi, Milano 2009, p. 322.
57 Currently, referendums on crucial national issues may only be held following a decision 
of the absolute majority of parliament (Art. 44 § 2). Prior to the 5 July 2015 bailout referendum 
no. referendum had been held in Greece since the 1975 Constitution was enacted. For a focus 
on the role of the people in constitutional amending processes see X. Contiades, A. Fotiadou, 
Participatory Constitutional Change: The People as Amenders of the Constitution, Routledge 2016.
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secularism reserving, however, for historical and practical reasons, to the or-
thodoxy the status of dominant religion. The text also provides for the aboli-
tion of the obligation for state officers, judges and other public officials to take 
an oath in the hands of the ecclesiastical authorities of the Greek Orthodox 
Church (Art. 59 § 1, Art. 33 § 2). The Greek Government’s proposal makes 
some special provisions also concerning social rights expressly prohibiting 
lifting public management of water and energy, banning any privatization in 
these sectors, safeguarding collective negotiations as the only means for the 
definition of wages, and introducing arbitration as a mandatory means for 
the resolution of relevant labor disputes.
During the few weeks an intense debate has developed engaging several per-
sonalities of the political and academic world58, while waiting for the Commit-
tee that will deal with all aspects of the amending procedure to be appointed. 
The revision process will start with a wide consultation in all municipalities, 
a process not envisaged by the Constitution itself. Normally, revisions of the 
Constitution are handled only by the Parliament. First, discussions on consti-
tutional amendments would be held at the municipal level with professional 
associations, chambers of commerce, non-governmental associations and cit-
izens. The outcome of these discussions would be evaluated through assem-
blies in the thirteen regions of the country. A special website would be estab-
lished to allow citizens to submit their proposals, agreements and objections.
The question here is whether the political conditions to deliver the gov-
ernment’s revision project occur. The knots still to unravel concern, specif-
ically, the possibility of reaching an agreement between the political forces 
on the strategy and the parts of the Constitution to be changed. The possi-
bility of an agreement between the politically relevant actors has never been 
more distant than during the last months, because of the growing polariza-
58 The academic community has been very active in the debate over the constitutional 
reform. The exchanges among constitutional law professors have been hosted by the legal 
review Επίκαιρα Θέματα Συνταγματικού Δικαίου, “European Center of Constitutional Law”, 
Themistocles Tsatsos Foundation, July–August 2016. Ex multis v. X. Contiades, Η συνταγμα-
τική αναθεώρηση. The debate over the reform has crossed academic borders and reached the 
wider public, also thanks to the initiative promoted by a leading Greek newspapers. Among 
the many scholars who have spoken out on the pages of the newspaper see G. Ierapetritis, 
Το μετέωρο συνταγματικό βήμα, http://www.kathimerini.gr/871051/opinion/epikairothta/
politikh/to-metewro-syntagmatiko-vhma (15.08.2016).
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tion and the creeping tension between political parties. Currently, therefore, 
the achievement of a general consensus on the next constitutional reform 
does not seem possible. The poisoned atmosphere of Greek politics, exacer-
bated by the severe economic crisis and the difficulties expressed by the polit-
ical class in managing it, makes it bold to assume a dialogue or collaboration 
among political forces, highlighting the shortcomings of the constitutional 
culture and Greek politics. It should be up to those who now hold the majority 
to adopt a more conciliatory attitude so as to prevent the reform from falling 
on a petty conflict, losing, perhaps, an opportunity to improve the function-
ing of constitutional institutions. The spasmodic search of systemic stability 
through technical aids, changing the electoral system, as it has been recent-
ly done, or amending the constitution, has clear risks to which the Greek po-
litical system, characterized by a lack of homogeneity, does not seem, for the 
moment, able to expose itself without incurring in major consequences. The 
most recent attempts to amend the Constitution have been undertaken in the 
absence of a shared consensus. The process has been sponsored by a domi-
nant political class pervaded by extemporaneous opportunism, that in an ef-
fort to annihilate the opposition loses sight of the real needs of the country, 
still immobilized by the grip of the economic crisis and poorly interested in 
the tampering of the constitutional charter masked by strengthening popu-
lar participation through a deepening of the instruments of direct democracy.
The broad scope of the proposed amendments requires, therefore, the 
Greek legislator to pay extreme attention to avoid the risk that the constitu-
tional revision is reduced to a mere political diversion to ensure the perma-
nence in power in the absence of consent and to deflect attention from con-
tinued controversial austerity policies.
Literarure
Anthopoulos Ch., The control of constitutionality of the electoral laws in Greece and the un-
constitutionality of the current electoral system, “Efimerida Dioikitikou Dikaiou” 2015.
Bakopoulou Ν., Περι Των Αναθεωρητεων Διαταξεων Του Συνταγματος Αναφορικώς-
προς το Συμβούλιον της Επικρατείας και την Οργάνωσιν της Διοικητικής Δικαιοσύ-
νης, Library of aueb.
34 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2017/6
Chryssogonos K., An introduction to Greek electoral law, http://www.cecl.gr/rigasnet-
work/databank/REPORTS/r8/GR_8_Chryssogonos.html.
Chryssogonos K., Electoral system and Constitution, Athina–Komotini, 1996.
Clogg R., Greece, [in:] Democracy and Elections: Electoral Systems and Their Political Con-
sequences, eds. V. Bogdanor, D. Butler, Cambridge 1983.
Contiades X., Fotiadou A., Participatory Constitutional Change: The People as Amenders 
of the Constitution, Routledge 2016.
Contiades X., Εξορθολογισμός της διαδικασίας, http://www.kathimerini.gr/870289/article/
epikairothta/politikh/e3or8ologismos-ths-diadikasias.
Contiades X., Η συνταγματική αναθεώρηση, “Έθνος”, 14.06.2016.
Dagtoglou Pr., Constitutional Law, Human rights, 3rd ed., Athina–Komotini 2010.
Foundedaki P., Αναθεώρηση με λιτή διατύπωση, Καθηγήτρια Συνταγματικού Δικαίου στο 
Τμήμα Πολιτικής Επιστήμης και Ιστορίας, “Καθημερινή”, 27.06.2016.
Ierapetritis G., Ισορροπία εξουσιών και δικαστικός παρεμβατισμός: Συγκριτικές σκέψεις 
στη λειτουργία του Ελληνικού Συμβουλίου Επικρατείας και του Ανωτάτου Ομοσπον-
διακού Δικαστηρίου των ΗΠ, [in:] Τιμητικός Τόμος για τα 75 χρόνια του Συμβουλίου 
Επικρατείας, Athens–Thessaloniki 2004.
Ierapetritis G., Το μετέωρο συνταγματικό βήμα, http://www.kathimerini.gr/871051/opin-
ion/epikairothta/politikh/to-metewro-syntagmatiko-vhma.
Ierapetritis G., Το Σύνταγμα και ο δικαστής: Μια αέναη διαλεκτική σχέση. Σκέψεις με 
αφορμή τις αποφάσεις 3242/2004 και 343/2004 του ΣτΕ για τον «βασικό μέτοχο», “No-
miko Vima” 2005, no. 4.
Kalogirou N., Parliamentary republic and electoral system, Athina–Komotini 1989.
Kassimatis G., Μελέτες. IV, Ειδικά θέματα δικαστικής εξουσίας 1973–1999, Athens–Kom-
motinì 2000 τόμος IV/7, https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_ordinary_courts-18-EL-it.do.
Katrougalos G., Γιατί νέο Σύνταγμα; Και πώς, “Καθημερινή”, 19.06.2016.
Lamprinakou C., Electoral System Change in Europe since 1945: Greece, https://www.google.
gr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=9&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEw-
jSjZf5u83PAhVMthQKHRiIAB4QFghdMAg&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.electoral-
systemchanges.eu%2FFiles%2Fmedia%2FMEDIA_199%2FFILE%2FGreece_summary.
docx&usg=AFQjCNGa4TWp9XuO8KRJYLMsVZGCwotfVA&bvm=bv.135258522,d.
bGg (9.10.2016).
Lanchester F., Costantino Mortati e la “Legislatura costituente”, [in:] Atti del Convegno 
Costantino Mortati: Potere costituente e limiti alla revisione costituzionale Roma 14 
dicembre 2015, “Nomos – Le attualità nel diritto” 2016, no. 1.
Lazaratos P., Συνταγματική αναθεώρηση και Δημοψήφισμα, “Capital.gr”, 08.06.2016.
Lorencka M., Influence of the economic crisis on the functioning of the political systems in 
Greece, [in:] T. Kubin, M. Lorencka, M. Mysliwiec, Impact of economic crisis on func-
tioning of political systems. A case study of Greece, Spain, and Italy, Katowice 2017.
35Giulia Aravantinou Leonidi, Mariathi Kalyviotou, Małgorzata Lorencka • Political System
Manitakis V.A., Fondement et légalité du contrôle juridictionnel des lois en Grèce, “Revue 
internationale de droit comparé” 1988, no. 1.
Mavrias K., Constitutional Law, 5th ed., Athens 2014.
Mavrias K., Εισήγηση κατά την ημερίδα της 27ης Φεβρουαρίου 2013.
Mavrias K., Συνταγματικό δίκαιο, Sakkoulas 2005.
Mendrinou M., The electoral policy in the Greek political system: internal and external as-
pects, 1974–2000, Athina 2000.
Metaxas G., Ιερότητες και αναγκαιότητες, http://www.kathimerini.gr/870290/article/epi-
kairothta/politikh/ierothtes-kai-anagkaiothtes.
Mortati C., Concetto, limiti, procedimento della revisione costituzionale (1952), ora in Rac-
colta di scritti, Milano 1972, II.
Pantelis A., The Greek electoral systems and the elections (1926–1985) on the computer, 
Athens 1988.
Papachelas A., Η αναθεώρηση του Συντάγματος, http://www.kathimerini.gr/863439/opin-
ion/epikairothta/politikh/h-ana8ewrhsh-toy-syntagmatos.
Papadimitriou G., Electoral system and governance system, [in:] Electoral system and form 
of government, Athina–Thessaloniki 2007.
Raikos A., The control of the validity of the elections of 20th November 1977, 1st comple-
ment of procedural electoral law, 1983.
Raikos A., The control of the validity of the elections of 22nd Septempter 1996, 6th Comple-
ment of procedural electoral law, 1999.
Raikos A., The control of the validity of the parliamentary and European parliamentary 
elections, 4th Complement of procedural electoral law, 1993.
Raikos A., The control of the validity of the parliamentary and European parliamentary 
elections, 5th Complement of procedural electoral law, 1996.
Sotirelis G.X., Ελαστικά και απαρέγκλιτα όρια του άρθρου 110Σ, http://www.kathimerini.
gr/870291/article/epikairothta/politikh/elastika-kai-aparegklita-oria-toy-ar8roy-110s.
Vegleris F., La Constitution, la loi et les tribunaux en Grèce, “Annales de la Faculté de 
Droit de Liège” 1967.
Vegleris F., Χαρακτηριστικά του ελληνικού Συμβουλίου της Επικρατείας, celebratory tome 
of the Council of State, Ι, Sakkoulas 1979.
Vegleris Ph., The particular nature of electoral law, Athina–Komotini 1992.
Venizelos E., Lessons of Constitutional Law, Athina–Komotini 2008.
View publication stats
